Introduction
After nearly three years of waiting, the North Gauteng High Court (then the Pretoria High Court) finally handed down judgment in March 2010 in the case of Christian
Roberts v Minister of Social Development.
1 The case was a constitutional challenge to section 10 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and the relevant Regulations, which set the age for accessing an old age grant at 60 for women and 65 for men.
After the hearing the High Court had reserved judgment. Pending judgment the government had amended the legislation in dispute so that the pensionable age for the purposes of accessing a social grant would be equalised over time. Despite the change in legislation, the High Court found against the applicants and punished them with a costs order.
Until such time as it is appealed against and overturned, as it stands this decision presents a grave concern to some constitutional law principles relating to mootness and the approach to costs in constitutional litigation between the State and private litigants. Particularly, the decision threatens the hitherto special role played by public interest litigants in vindicating constitutional rights ranging from access to housing and land, to the rights of the child, gay men and lesbian women and freedom of expression, among others. This contribution tackles two issues arising from the judgment of the High Court. The first issue is that of 'mootness', which arises from the government's decision to amend the impugned legislation complained of by the applicant, which effectively knocked the wind out of the applicants' constitutional challenge. The second issue is the decision by the judge to award an adverse costs order against the applicants and the amici. Guided by how the courts in South Africa and abroad have dealt with similar matters in the past, in this contribution the author aims to demonstrate the implications of this decision for constitutional law generally and for public interest litigation in particular.
Quite apart from the two issues referred to above as precipitating the present discussion, there is one more reason why a review of this judgment is necessary. A recent discussion with the attorney for the amici on the case has revealed that the prohibitively high costs of taking the matter on appeal to the full bench have discouraged the parties from pursuing this avenue. 2 The losing parties are also hoping that the government will come to its senses and abandon the costs awarded in its favour. This unfortunately has not happened until now. Thus the single judge's erroneous decision remains law for the time being, although it is wrong law.
The discussion commences with a brief factual background to the case, followed by a discussion of the important constitutional principle of the doctrine of mootness. This is followed by an outline of the principles relating to costs orders in matters raising an important constitutional issue, and in matters brought in the public interest.
The review concludes that the court a quo erred in deciding the merits of the case, and that even when it had decided to pronounce on the merits -as it did -it nonetheless should not have punished the applicants and the amici with the costs thereof. The correct approach was to order that each party pay his or her own costs.
Factual background
The pertinent facts are that four male applicants, above the age of 60 but below 65
at the time of the application, mounted a constitutional challenge to section 10 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and the relevant Regulations, which set the age for accessing old age grants at 60 for women and 65 for men. They attacked the differentiation on the basis that it violates the equality clause (section 9(3)) and the 2 A discussion with Moray Hawthorn of Webber Wentzel Attorneys, on 24 January 2012.
right of access to social assistance (section 27(1)(c)) guaranteed by the Constitution.
For its part, the government argued that the differentiation is aimed at addressing inequities faced by women generally, and by African women in particular. It was argued for the government that African women faced race, class and social discrimination during apartheid. However, subsequent to the hearing the government brought the discrimination to an end by amending the impugned legislation so that the differentiation would be phased out over a three-year period, so that men would access social old age grants from the age of 63 by April 2008; from 61 years by April 2009; and ultimately achieve equality (at 60) by April 2010. Despite this change in the legal position, the High Court found against the applicants and upheld the contentions justifying the retention of the differentiating scheme at the time the case was heard. In effect the High Court order sought to retain a dead legislative scheme.
The mootness doctrine
The legal doctrine confronting the Court -but ignored by the Court -in Christian Roberts is known as 'mootness'. The doctrine is well developed in American constitutional law jurisprudence. Accordingly, a case is a moot one if it 3 …seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it has actually been asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical effect upon a then existing controversy.
Furthermore, a case will be moot 4 [i]f the parties are not adverse, if the controversy is hypothetical, or if the judgment of the court for some other reason cannot operate to grant any actual relief, and the court is without power to grant a decision.
Barron and Dienes put it succinctly when they observe that a " [a] case or controversy requires present flesh and blood dispute that the courts can resolve". 5 Loots, a South a well-established and uniformly observed policy which directs them not to exercise it in favour of deciding points that are merely abstract, academic or hypothetical ones.
In that case, the legislation complained of by the applicants had been replaced by new legislation by the time the Court delivered judgment. The Court declined to make a decision on the merits of the case on the basis -as the Court put it, that 12 [T]here can hardly be a clearer instance of issues that are wholly academic, of issues exciting no interest but a historic one, than those on which our ruling is wanted have now become. The repeal of the Publications Act has disposed altogether of the questions pertaining to that. And any aspect of the one about the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act which our previous decision on it did not answer fully has been foreclosed by its repeal in turn. I therefore conclude that we should decline at this stage to grant a declaratory order on either topic.
In a persuasive dissenting opinion in President of the Republic of South Africa v

Hugo,
13 Didcott J expressed the view that the case had become moot as 14 …the respondent in this matter could derive no apparent benefit or advantage from the declaration which he sought and obtained from the lower court. The issue raised by him had also become by then 'wholly academic ... exciting no interest but an historical one'.
The respondent in the case, an imprisoned father of a twelve year old, had mounted a constitutional challenge to the exercise by the President of powers in terms of a presidential pardon decree. In terms of the decree the President was to grant an early release from prison to certain mothers of children younger than twelve years old. The respondent argued that the decree discriminated against him and his son on the grounds of sex and gender, in violation of his right to equality contained in section 8 of the Interim Constitution. Thus he sought an order from the Constitutional Court confirming the order of invalidity granted by the High Court in his favour.
According to Didcott J the respondent stood to benefit nothing from the order as, in the first place, he would not secure an early release from prison because the child was not younger than twelve years old when the case was lodged in the High Court and had reached the age of thirteen when the confirmation proceedings commenced. Secondly, deciding the case would result in no public benefit -and was [m]ootness is particularly likely to be a bar to relief where the constitutional issue is not merely moot as between the parties but is also moot relative to society at large, and no considerations of compelling public interest require the court to reach a conclusion.
In S v Manamela the Constitutional Court stated that it will decide a case despite the argument of mootness if to do so would be in the public interest.
19
The Constitutional Court did indeed entertain a moot matter in MEC for Education, In this case a school learner had returned to school from a holiday with a nose stud. The school decided the learner would not be allowed to wear the stud. The respondent, the learner's mother, took the school and the MEC for Education in KwaZulu-Natal to the Equality Court, alleging that they had unfairly discriminated against her child and had violated the child's religious and cultural rights. The Equality Court found that the school's decision to ban the wearing of the stud did not unfairly discriminate against the learner. The mother appealed against this finding to the High Court. The High Court upheld the appeal, holding that the school had unfairly discriminated against the learner. Although the removal has taken place, this case still presents a live controversy regarding the lawfulness of the eviction. Generally, unlawful conduct is inimical to the rule of law and to the development of a society based on dignity, equality and freedom. Needless to say, the applicants have an interest in the adjudication of the constitutional issue at stake. The matter cannot therefore be said to be moot. It is also live because if we find that the removal of the applicants was unlawful, it would be necessary to consider their claim for restitutionary relief. (footnotes omitted).
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court followed the correct approach to the While there is no equivalent of section 21A in respect of the Constitutional Court, the Court has held that it has discretion to exercise its powers in terms of section 172 (2) of the final Constitution to entertain a confirmation proceeding even when the issue in the case has become moot 34 and that in exercising this discretion it would consider if any order it may make would have any practical effect, either on the parties or on others. 35 The rule also finds application in respect of appeals to the Constitutional Court. 
Applying the mootness doctrine in Christian Roberts
As stated above, pending judgment in the case Christian Roberts the government had conceded defeat by removing the discriminating provisions in the Social Assistance Act, so that ultimately -that is, in 2010 -both men and women would access old age social grants at the age of 60. a change in the offending legislation pending judgment -the controversy had ceased to be a live one, and the issues had become wholly academic, and indeed excited no interest but a historic one.
It must, however, be asked if the court in Christian Roberts felt that it had to decide the matter despite it's being moot? We must ask this question because, as was shown above, a court has discretion to decide a moot case in exceptional circumstances. A reading of the above cases suggests that there are two discernible exceptions to the judicial policy governing moot cases. The first instance would be when it is in the public interest or society at large to decide the matter. The rationale here is that the case is moot only as between the parties, but there remains a need to guide future situations of a similar nature. The second instance, also related to the first one, is when the offending practice or conduct is capable of repetition. Both of these instances satisfy an essential underlying requirement, which is that the declaratory order must be of practical effect or advantage to someone. The answer to the question posed above in relation to the Christian Roberts matter is in the negative. As was the position in the three similar cases referred to above, there existed no such exceptional circumstances in the Christian Roberts case compelling the court to decide the matter. It is not difficult to see why that is so. A change in the offending legislation in this case -as in the other three cases -put the entire case to bed. There is certainly no future guidance to be provided to society at large by the Christian Roberts judgment. And indeed there is no threat of repetition of the offensive conduct without enabling legislation. Therefore the Court should have declined giving judgment in the matter.
5
The approach to costs in constitutional litigation
General principles
As a general approach to costs awards, the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin 39 stated that factors such as the "conduct of the parties", the "conduct of their legal representatives", "whether a party achieves a technical victory only", the "nature of …one should be cautious in awarding costs against litigants who seek to enforce their constitutional right against the state, particularly where the constitutionality of a statutory provision is attacked, lest such orders have an unduly inhibiting or "chilling" effect on other potential litigants in this category. This cautious approach cannot, however, be allowed to develop into an inflexible rule so that litigants are induced into believing that they are free to challenge the constitutionality of statutory provisions in this court, no matter how spurious the grounds for doing so may be or how remote the possibility that this court will grant them access. This can neither be in the interests of the administration of justice nor fair to those who are forced to oppose such attacks.
The Court felt that the conduct of the applicant in this case was objectionable for a number of reasons and thus punished the applicant with a costs order. Registrar's conduct violated its right to information held by the State in terms of section 32 of the Constitution. 48 The applicant was successful in the litigation in that it had been given access to the information it sought and which it was entitled to receive (not confidential information). The High Court, however, gave a punitive costs order against the applicant on the basis that the applicant had not been specific enough in its request about the precise information sought. The Court stated that the rationale for this principle is three-fold. In the first place, the Court observed, the rule 50 diminishes the chilling effect that adverse costs orders would have on parties seeking to assert constitutional rights. Constitutional litigation frequently goes through many courts and the costs involved can be high. Meritorious claims might not be proceeded with because of a fear that failure could lead to financially ruinous consequences. Similarly, people might be deterred from pursuing constitutional claims because of a concern that even if they succeed they will be deprived of their costs because of some inadvertent procedural or technical lapse.
The second reason concerns the reach of the outcome in a constitutional matter, its contribution to jurisprudence, as well as its meaning to South Africans. In the words of the Court:
51
[C]onstitutional litigation, whatever the outcome, might ordinarily bear not only on the interests of the particular litigants involved, but on the rights of all those in similar situations. Indeed, each constitutional case that is heard enriches the general body of constitutional jurisprudence and adds texture to what it means to be living in a constitutional democracy.
The third reason behind the principle, according to the Court, concerns the bearer of the primary responsibility to ensure that both the law and the conduct of the state are In the present matter, Biowatch achieved substantial success. Not only did it manage to rebut a number of preliminary objections aimed at keeping the case out of court altogether, it also succeeded in getting a favourable response from the Court to eight of the eleven categories of information it sought.
The second reason concerned the failure by the High Court to consider the constitutional aspect of the case. The Court noted that in granting the application for leave to appeal against his costs order to the Full Bench, the single judge conceded overlooking the constitutional dimension of the litigation when awarding costs and merely stated that it had been "at the back of his mind". This, however, did not save the judge's mishap from criticism by the Court. The Court found that 54 …his failure to expressly locate the costs award in a constitutional setting must raise serious doubts as to the weight, if any, given to the constitutional context.
Before approaching the Constitutional Court, the applicant had appealed to the Full Bench of the High Court against the costs order. The Full Bench had similarly dismissed the appeal without considering the constitutional aspect of the case. The
Court was particularly sharp in its language against the Full Bench for its failure to consider the constitutional dimension to the litigation in its consideration of the appeal. In particular, the Court said that "the omission [by the Full Bench] of the constitutional dimension constitutes a serious misdirection".
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The third reason was that the Court found nothing untoward about the conduct of the applicant during litigation that would justify -not even the lack of specificity in the The lack of precision and the sweeping character of the requests for information as well as of the claims made in the notice of motion had not prevented the High Court from being able to give a thorough and well-substantiated judgment on the merits. Far from being frivolous or vexatious, the application raised important constitutional issues and achieved considerable success.
The fourth reason had to do with why the applicant was forced to litigate in the first place. The Court pointed out that it was the State's failure to provide the information sought which triggered the litigation. Thus in the words of the Court:
57
Biowatch had been compelled to go to court. The root cause of the dispute had been the persistent failure of the governmental authorities to provide legitimatelysought information. They were obliged to pass on information in their possession, save only for material which could reasonably be withheld in order to protect certain prescribed interests. As the High Court ultimately found, the bulk of the requests referred to information that had indeed to be disclosed. Only after four requests had been made to different state officials, without success, was litigation embarked upon. (footnote omitted)
The fifth reason concerned the question as to who bears the primary responsibility to ensure that both the law and State conduct are consistent with the Constitution. The
Court found that the state was the bearer of this responsibility, and that it had failed to discharge this duty by not providing legitimately sought information which it was legally obliged to release. The Court held that:
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Not only did the appropriate officials fail to fulfil their constitutional and statutory duties in providing information, thus compelling Biowatch to litigate, the governmental agencies compounded this by obdurately raising a series of unsustainable technical and procedural objections to Biowatch's suit.
Notably in the Biowatch case the Court did not simply recite the rule as developed in the abovementioned cases, but added the welcome element of considering who bears the primary responsibility to ensure that both the law and state conduct are at one with the Constitution. 
Public interest litigation and costs in the Constitutional Court
As pointed out above, there is no discernible reason as to why the Court in Christian Roberts gave judgment, except to punish the applicants and the amici with a costs order. This has significant implications for the development of constitutional jurisprudence in general and for public interest litigation in particular.
In Biowatch the applicants and the amici 59 pointed out to the Court the role played by public interest advocacy groups in advancing constitutional litigation. They contended that an adverse costs award would not only inhibit the institution of litigation in the public interest but would also be disastrous to their "…capacity… to exist and do their work". 60 They further argued that the "High Court misdirected itself in not giving any, or sufficient, regard to the fact that Biowatch was a public interest NGO litigating not on its own behalf but in the public interest. Sachs J, on behalf of the majority, dismissed this contention. He stated that in his view the correct starting point in determining costs in a constitutional litigation should not be who the parties are, but the nature of the issues. 61 He further stated that:
62
Equal protection under the law requires that costs awards not be dependent on whether the parties are acting in their own interests or in the public interest. Nor should they be determined by whether the parties are financially well-endowed or indigent or, as in the case of many NGOs, reliant on external funding. The primary consideration in constitutional litigation must be the way in which a costs order would hinder or promote the advancement of constitutional justice.
Sachs J further emphasised the obligation that the courts be impartial towards the litigants who appear before them, and that no litigant should be favoured over the other in awarding costs because of their social status. In particular, he stated that 63 …litigants should not be treated disadvantageously in making costs and related awards simply because they are pursuing commercial interests and have deep pockets. Nor should they be looked upon with favour because they are fighting for the poor and lack funds themselves. What matters is whether rich or poor, advantaged or disadvantaged, they are asserting rights protected by the Constitution.
He concluded that the nature of the issues and the manner in which the litigants conducted themselves during the proceedings should be decisive in determining the award of costs in constitutional litigation. In his words: 64 …a party should not get a privileged status simply because it is acting in the public interest or happens to be indigent. It should be held to the same standards of conduct as any other party, particularly if it has had legal representation. This means it should not be immunised from appropriate sanctions if its conduct has been vexatious, frivolous, professionally unbecoming or in any other similar way abusive of the processes of the Court.
It is submitted that Sachs J's views on how to approach the issue of costs in litigation instituted in the public interest seem not to be entirely congruent with the rapidly rising tide of cases cautioning against awarding adverse costs orders against public interest advocacy groups which raise constitutional issues. In these cases the significance of the role played by these groups has been singled out by the courts.
As early in our constitutional dispensation as 1996, Mohamed DP, in Ex parte
Gauteng Legislature, 65 cautioned against discouraging persons trying to vindicate their constitutional rights from doing so by the risk of attracting an adverse costs order if they lost the case on merits. Mohamed DP in particular stated that persons seeking 66 …to ventilate an important issue of constitutional principle … should not be discouraged from doing so by the risk of having to pay the costs of their adversaries, if the Court takes a view which is different from the view taken by the petitioner. This, of course, does not mean that such litigants can be completely protected from that risk. The Court, in its discretion, might direct that they pay the costs of their adversaries if, for example, the grounds of attack on the impugned statute are frivolous or vexatious or they have acted from improper motives or there are other circumstances which make it in the interest of justice to direct that such costs should be paid by the losing party. The respondents sought to vindicate a constitutional protection. Nothing before us suggests that they ought to be mulcted for costs for doing so. On the contrary, an order as to costs against the respondents would be inappropriate. I plan to make none. In my view it would be fair and just that the parties pay their own costs in the High Court and before this Court.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, there is a growing set of cases heard by the Constitutional Court where the Court regarded the nature of the litigationparticularly public interest litigation -as an important factor in exercising its discretionary powers in relation to costs awards. 
Public interest litigation and costs in other South African courts
Apart from the Constitutional Court, other South African courts have also pronounced on the significance of taking public interest litigation as an important factor in determining costs. This section looks at some of these cases, in which the ordinary common law principles relating to cost orders were departed from.
In Hlatshwayo v Hein the Land Claims Court recognised that before it was a case that could be "recognised as falling under a new era of public interest litigation" and that "[t]his tends to set it apart from conventional litigation". The Court further stated that:
71 …our law recognises that in the exercise of its discretion relating to costs a court may deprive a successful party of his or her costs and the trend in the Constitutional Court at least appears to be in the direction of recognising public interest cases as one of those circumstances where it may be appropriate to do so.
In Silvermine Valley Coalition, the Cape High Court -in an environmental law context -made a pertinent observation regarding costs in public interest litigation. In this case there was a failed attempt by the applicant to prevent the development of a vineyard in a nature conservation area. In determining costs, the Court stated:
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NGOs should not have unnecessary obstacles placed in their way when they act in a manner designed to hold the State and indeed the private community to the constitutional commitments of our new society, which includes the protection of the environment.
In Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town, the Court refused to make an adverse costs order against the applicant despite the applicant's losing the case. 73 The applicant had challenged the power of a Municipality to levy service charges comprising "partly property rates" and "partly service fees". The Court held that "even though the interests the applicant seeks to promote are the private interests of the individuals whom it represents, the applicant raises a constitutional issue of The guiding principle in this regard appears to be that the question of costs in constitutional and public interest litigation remains a discretionary matter. However, parties who litigate to test the constitutionality of law or conduct usually seek to ventilate important issues relating to constitutional principle. Such persons should not be discouraged from doing so by running the risk of having to pay the costs of their adversaries, if the court takes a view which is different from the view taken by the petitioner. These principles have been applied uniformly where litigation is against an organ of State. The same principles apply in cases involving private litigants where a party litigates for public purposes and in the public interest. The Court's discretion could be exercised against a private litigant, however, inter alia, where the litigation was spurious or frivolous or where such litigant has not acted in good faith or where it was apparently pursuing private commercial interests. In my view, the applicants in the present case raised matters of great public interest and concern -not for any benefit or advantage to themselves, but bona fide and for the common good, as perceived by them. Moreover, the points they raised, though ultimately unsuccessful, were not without merit. In line with the general approach outlined above, I am of the view that it would be fair if no order as to costs were made, thus leaving each party to pay its own costs.
The trend therefore appears to have been followed by other courts in South Africa that the judicial discretion in relation costs awards in a constitutional litigation, particularly against the State, brought in the public interest -unless the application is frivolous or vexatious or the applicant behaved in an objectionable manner -is to be exercised in such a manner that it does not lead to adverse costs orders against such litigants, particularly where they are unsuccessful.
Public interest litigation and costs in other countries
This section briefly looks at other countries which share South Africa's general rules on costs award, perhaps as a result of sharing the same common law heritage with South Africa. Their jurisprudence is particularly helpful as these countries appear to take the same approach as our courts in relation to costs in public interest litigation.
The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom the attitude of courts in relation to costs in public interest litigation is succinctly set out in R (Corner House Research) some … authorities… demonstrate a trend towards protecting litigants, who reasonably bring public law proceedings in the public interest, from the liability to costs that falls, as a general rule, on an unsuccessful party.
Unlike in South Africa, there is another mechanism through which public interest litigants can shield themselves from a potentially economically ruinous costs order. This is done through the so-called "Protective Costs Order", in terms of which a party may approach the court ahead of a hearing for an order limiting the party's liability for costs should it be unsuccessful. This mechanism was used in the recent case of 
Canada
The Canadian Courts also accord significance to public interest litigation as a factor to be taken into account in determining costs. In Mahar v Rogers Cable Systems Ltd the Court stated: 80 (I)t is fair to characterise this proceeding as a public interest suit. While the ordinary cost rules apply in public interest litigation, those rules do include a discretion to relieve the loser of the burden of paying the winner's costs and that discretion has on occasion been exercised in favour of public interest litigants. … In my view, it is appropriate in this case to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicant and to make no order as to costs. The issue raised was novel and certainly involved a matter of public interest. While I decided the jurisdictional point against the applicant, I am satisfied that the application was brought in good faith for the genuine purpose of having a point of law of general public interest resolved.
In [A] consideration relevant to the application of costs rules is access to justice. This factor has increased in importance as litigation over matters of public interest has become more common, especially since the advent of the Charter. In special cases where individual litigants of limited means seek to enforce their constitutional rights, courts often exercise their discretion on costs so as to avoid the harshness that might result from adherence to the traditional principles. This helps to ensure that ordinary citizens have access to the justice system when they seek to resolve matters of consequence to the community as a whole.
New Zealand
In New Zealand too, public interest litigation is encouraged inter alia by shielding that category of litigants from adverse costs orders where the applications are genuine. ALRC published a report 87 in which it stated that public interest litigation was an "important mechanism for clarifying legal issues to the benefit of the general community, and commented that what it described as 'the costs indemnity rule' had a deterrent effect on this type of litigation". 88 The ALRC recommended that "courts or tribunals should have power to make public interest costs orders at any stage of the proceedings, and suggested criteria which should be taken into account when determining what type of order to make". 89 It was suggested that it might be ordered that each party bear its own costs, or that: 90 …the party applying for the public interest costs order, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings, shall not be liable to pay the other party's costs; …only be liable to pay a specified proportion of the other party's costs; or … be able to recover part of his or her costs from the other party.
In Oshlack v Richmond Council, the High Court of Australia upheld a decision by the court a quo not to award costs in favour of the respondents who successfully defended an application aimed at preserving endangered fauna. In the Court's view there were "sufficient special circumstances to justify departure from the ordinary rules as to costs". These circumstances, according to the Court, included the fact that, firstly, "[t]he appellant had nothing to gain from the litigation other than the worthy motive of seeking to uphold environmental law and the preservation of endangered fauna". Secondly, "[a] significant number of members of the public shared the appellant's stance, so that in that sense there was a public interest in the outcome of the litigation". And, thirdly, according to the Court, 91 …the challenge had raised and resolved significant issues as to the interpretation and future administration of statutory provisions relating to the protection of endangered fauna and the present and future administration of the development consent in question, which had implications for the council, the developer and the public.
The jurisprudence in these countries thus points to a settled international legal position in relation to costs in public interest litigation. courts should not fully embrace this trend, which is designed to serve the twin goals of encouraging public interest litigation and to promote access to justice.
Applying the costs principles to Christian Roberts
I now turn to applying the costs principles discussed above to Christian Roberts.
Costs in constitutional litigation
The line of cases looked at above has established clear principles in relation to costs in constitutional litigation. Where a private litigant brings a case raising an important constitutional issue, such as testing the constitutionality of a statute, and loses the challenge, unless the challenge was bad or the private litigant behaved in an objectionable manner, a court must depart from the traditional common law principle regarding costs -that costs must follow the event -and order that each party keep its costs. It is thus submitted that while the Court had found against the applicants on the merits, the constitutional dimension precluded the judge from making an adverse costs order against the applicants and the amici. Furthermore, there existed no special circumstances in the case to justify departure from this important constitutional principle. It is admitted that the High Court costs orders in cases such as Affordable Medicine 92 and Biowatch 93 did perhaps set a precedent for the manner in which the Court in Christian Roberts exercised its judicial discretion in relation to costs in a litigation with a constitutional dimension, but these costs orders were sharply criticised and overturned on appeal.
Frivolous or vexatious applications
Secondly, it must be asked if the case was frivolous or vexatious, and if the applicants during litigation behaved in a manner justifying a punitive costs order against them. This must be asked because the Court did hint that the conduct of the The amici curiae, in essence, had ganged with the applicants against the respondents … and they should be regarded as having failed in their quest, thus attracting costs against them.
This remark, which is the only discernible reason from the judgment as to why the Court punished the applicants with a costs order, is unfortunate indeed. There was nothing frivolous or vexatious about the conduct of both the amici and the applicants in this matter. Furthermore, there was nothing "spurious" about the grounds upon which the amici and the applicants attacked the legislation in question.
Costs in public interest litigation
Thirdly, not only was the matter brought to test the constitutionality of a statute, but it was also instituted in the public interest. As shown above, the trend -both in South The third implication of ignoring this growing trend is to curtail access to the courts, and therefore access to justice. For instance, of the right of access to housing cases referred to, eviction cases constitute a majority. These often involve poor people.
Without the support and participation of public interest groups such poor citizens would have very limited access to justice. It is thus submitted that the constitutional practice of shielding public interest litigants from adverse costs orders in genuine cases should be followed by all courts.
Conclusion
This note dealt with two issues emanating from the High Court's judgment in the It has been argued that the adverse costs awards against the applicants and the amici in the Christian Roberts were not justified as the conduct of the litigants was neither frivolous nor vexatious. Furthermore, the grounds upon which the impugned legislation and the accompanying regulations were challenged were above board as they precipitated an amendment of the statute complained of.
Finally, it has been shown that the implications of departing from this sensible approach to costs in public interest litigation are dire. Not only would the risk of attracting adverse costs orders in good constitutional challenges dishearten this group of litigants, but it would arrest the development of constitutional jurisprudence.
Most significantly, keeping public interest groups away from courts through adverse costs orders would shatter the only hope that poor citizens currently have of accessing the courts, and therefore of accessing justice. 
